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Abstract: This paper advances a holistic ecological approach based on a three-compartment
model. This approach favors policy initiatives that lie at the intersection of the
three major areas of concern common to most environmental controversies:
environmental protection, provision of basic human needs, and advancing
economic welfare.  In support of this approach, we propose a "pluralistic
stewardship” integrating core elements of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and
ecocentrism.  After presenting the basics of our model, we then explain why it is
important to identify and promote a holistic ecological approach to sustainability. 
Here we employ the economic concept of path dependence, emphasizing that there
exist multiple paths society can follow in environmental ethics and policy but once
one has been chosen, implicitly or explicitly, there may be little opportunity to
reverse such choices. 
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Based on Pluralistic Stewardship
Bryan Norton argues that a consensus is emerging among environmentalists on how to
treat nature.
1  That consensus is based on widespread acceptance of much ecological theory and a
common desire to protect nature to some extent, if for different reasons.  For example, bird
watchers and duck hunters both advocate protection of wetlands, even though many members of
these two groups may strongly disagree on other environmental questions.  Their conditionally
common cause is based on shared valuation of ducks (albeit for different reasons) and mutual
acceptance of ecological studies showing that ducks and other birds are dependent on wetlands. 
There is growing recognition that consensus among communities exhibiting quite different values
is emerging from increasingly widespread acceptance and understanding of ecological science and
of participative decision-making.  
Consensus does not, however, extend throughout the range of environmental controversy. 
Consequently, Norton has pursued the notion of "contextualism" as an explicit attempt at
integrating socioeconomic and environmental concerns, which are commonly pitted against one
another in sustainability debates.  This paper extends Norton's and others’ arguments for a
pluralistic approach to achieving consensus and resolving controversies about environmentally
sustainable development.  The first step is to recognize the multiple aims within the community of
stakeholders.  Thus in section one we identify distinct objectives pursued by different parties to
contemporary environmental policy debates, further refining a previously proposed conceptual
model.
2  Identification of multiple interests leads directly to the second section of the paper,wherein we review the distinct major value systems underpinning different objectives in
contemporary debate over sustainability.  In an important sense, the language of value systems, or
“centrisms”, is itself a source of controversy, in which anthropocentrists, biocentrists and
ecocentrists are too often unnecessarily pitted against one another.  As we discuss in the second
section, two distinct, albeit connected, senses of centrisms, are commonly confounded in
contemporary debate.  Distinguishing among these more clearly may help the various parties to
sustainability debates find common ground.
In the third section we introduce our notion of holistic “pluralistic stewardship.”  We
argue the importance of pluralistic stewardship, invoking the economic concept of path
dependence, which emphasizes that there exist multiple paths society can follow in environmental
ethics and policy, but once one has been followed there may be little opportunity to reverse
course.  The too-often confrontational approach evident in the contemporary industrial world
creates considerable risks; we believe there exists a more durable, effective and just approach.  In
closing, we briefly discuss a promising initiative that fits the spirit of pluralistic stewardship.
I. Intersecting Concerns in the Contemporary Sustainability Debate
We consider the contemporary sustainability debate excessively polarized, devolving too
often into a struggle between pro- and anti-environment camps, each possessing remarkable
political power and wealth.  Marginalized groups (e.g., poor human communities, unprotected
species) are too often left out.  An objective of this paper is to promote a more consensual
approach to conceptualizing and pursuing environmentally sustainable human societies.
A broadly acceptable definition of “sustainable development” is notoriously elusive.  As
Lélé points out, “the concept of sustainability originated in the context of renewable resourcessuch as forests or fisheries, and has subsequently been adopted as a broad slogan by the
environmental movement.”
3  The common denominator beneath any serious definition of
sustainable development includes (i) the maintenance of ecological conditions necessary to
maintain an ecosystem supportive of human life, and (ii) some notion of intergenerational equity,
i.e., that current generations cannot expend so much natural capital as to leave future generations
predictably worse off than contemporary folk.  For many people, including us, sustainable
development is somewhat more expansive, also depending upon (iii) achievement and
maintenance of social cohesion among humans, based on mutual respect, care and justice, to
maintain a social system supportive of human life, and (iv) safeguards to protect the intrinsic value
and associated collective biotic rights of extrahuman creation.  This is both a conceptual and an
empirical point.
The crux of the challenge to making environmentally sustainable policy is thus the
reconciliation of different communities’ divergent interests in ecosystem maintenance and
intragenerational and intergenerational distribution.  One can crudely distinguish between three
categories of relevant human concerns commonly expressed in most debate about sustainability:
protecting the natural environment, advancing economic welfare, and providing basic human
needs.
4  Some people are concerned that human overexploitation of the natural environment
ultimately threatens human survival (although such instrumental aims may not be the only reason
for advocating environmental protection).
5  Others argue that some depletion of natural resources
is inevitable, and therefore that economic growth is necessary to stimulate savings and thereby the
accumulation of manmade capital that is (at least partly) substitutable for natural capital so as to
ensure that future generations enjoy at least the same standard of living prevailing today.
6  Still
others decry the inattention paid to intragenerational distributional issues in the previous twoperspectives.
7  Their concern is that environmental protection and economic growth can be
exclusive, injuring either nonhuman elements of the biosphere or today’s poor to benefit future
human generations descended from today’s elites.  
Pursuit of any one of these goals generally affects each of the others, due primarily to
feedback effects, as we discuss later in this section.  Areas of intersection among these distinct, if
crudely defined, concerns capture the existence of strategies that can advance all three objectives
simultaneously.  Meanwhile, there also exist approaches that advance one or perhaps two
concerns at the expense of the other concern(s).  The latter class probably best represents the
modal approach to environmental policy in the twentieth century, in which environmental
protection and/or basic human needs provision have often been sacrificed at the altar of aggregate
economic growth.  One can thus envision a Venn diagram comprised of three intersecting spheres,
each  representing a different one of those three stylized concerns.  This builds on a similar,
two-component approach, based on environmental protection and economics, already on offer.
8 
The expansion to a third dimension is necessary because social scientists and philosophers have
long recognized the relationship between economic welfare and the satisfaction of basic human
needs to be weak.
9  Neoclassical economic welfare arguments largely ignore distributional issues,
tending toward utilitarian assessments that celebrate aggregate growth.
10 
Myopic pursuit of any one of the three goals in our simple heuristic often has unforeseen
adverse effects on one or both of the others.  And those adverse effects often have subsequent
contagion effects on the initial goal due to the inextricability of human distributional questions,
economic growth and environmental protection.  For instance, the particular form of industrial
economic growth pursued in the twenty-five years following World War II has had adverse (and
generally unanticipated) spillover effects on the environment (e.g., atmospheric acid deposition,water pollution, and toxic waste disposal).  Many believe it has likewise degraded the satisfaction
of basic human needs for underprivileged groups within industrial and pre-industrial economies.
11 
Moreover, in places like the former Soviet Union and the transition states of eastern Europe, the
adverse environmental effects of a previous generation’s myopic pursuit of economic growth are
now coming back to retard economic growth.  
Less commonly recognized are the adverse effects of some forms of environmental
protection.  For example, the western “fences and fines” approach to wildlife conservation and
parks management has largely failed to safeguard biodiversity in rural Africa and has imposed a
significant cost in terms of foregone economic growth and reduced standards of living among
communities on the peripheries of most protected areas.  In Kenya alone, 2.8 percent of GDP is
spent annually to conserve biological diversity through protected parks, forests and nature
reserves, while 30 percent of its population remains mired in abject poverty and communities
around protected areas overwhelmingly favor degazetting those lands to permit agricultural
production for subsistence cultivation.
12  Among poor, rural Africans one too commonly hears
western environmentalists referred to as “green imperialists”.
Economists label situations in which the full costs (or benefits) of a choice are not borne
by the decision-taker “externalities”.  Actions to advance economic welfare, basic human needs
provision, or environmental protection often create externalities. Externalities  result in socially
inefficient decision-making and, in some cases, outright harm done to disenfranchised persons and
species.  Where there are feedback effects, as certainly seems the case in the interaction of human
and nonhuman systems in the biosphere, satisfaction of different objectives appears co-requisite to
the lasting achievement of any one objective.  In other words, each objective—environmental
protection, the advance of economic welfare, and meeting basic human needs—has both intrinsicand instrumental value.  Especially because we poorly understand the complex feedback loops
within human societies and between human society and the extrahuman environment, failure to
view the environmental challenge in a holistic fashion often sows the seed of failure. Holism is
necessary to sustainability.
While there may be negative externalities to the myopic pursuit of one or two of these
goals, exclusive of the other(s), there also appear to be positive externalities associated with
pursuing the three goals in unison.  Advocates from different perspectives can learn from each
others.  This is likely to yield increased information availability and probability of success in
achieving each goal, as well as reminding people of — and thereby reinforcing — shared values. 
Cooperative pursuit of multiple objectives can yield large dividends. 
Economists' standard answer to the problem of externalities is to internalize them by one
of two means.  The first standard option from economics is to move decision-making authority to
a higher level, encompassing both the original decision-taker and those affected secondarily. 
Command-and-control approaches have occasionally been successful, but have generally proved
ineffective means of environmental regulation.  Moreover, there exists the fundamental problem
that no authority credibly and equitably represents all species, places and generations.  Not only is
there no world human government, there is no mortal entity capable of perfectly managing the
biosphere.  The conglomeration of all parties under one decision- making authority is not feasible
with respect to issues transcending space, species, and time.  Selective regulation can be and has
been effective, but government authority is not a magic bullet to externalities problems.
The second approach to internalize externalities follows from the Coase theorem, which
states that in the absence of transactions costs and in the presence of a complete set of property
rights, markets will induce individuals to resolve externalities through voluntary transactions.  Onthis basis there has been much recent excitement for market solutions like tradable permits. 
Incentive-based approaches to environmental protection— i.e., taxes or transferable property
rights— properly emphasize the need for accountability for the consequences of one’s actions. 
The problem arises, however, that transactions costs are insuperable across species, generations,
and, sometimes, cultures.  If those to whom one must be accountable cannot transact, market
incentive-based approaches fail to resolve externality problems fully.
13  Moreover, the economic
(Pareto) efficiency of market exchange is predicated on a socially acceptable ex ante distribution
of rights within and across generations.  The valuation of environmental and resource services and
stocks varies considerably with hypothetical changes to the intergenerational distribution of
property rights.
14  But we haven’t institutional or legal mechanisms for assigning and protecting
future generations’ rights, so it is not at all clear that one should accept partial (in the sense that
there is no intergenerational market) market equilibria as either economically efficient or just.
Decision makers (in business, conservation groups, government, etc.) commonly ignore or
are indifferent to others’ perspectives. Hence they too often fail to choose mutually beneficial
paths.  A surplus of negative externalities and a shortage of positive ones results.  The challenge
of sustainability arises from the limitations of the two textbook economics approaches to
resolving externalities.  Where fundamental differences of fact, value or attitude divide interested
parties to environmental debates, there is no technocratic solution.  Other means must be found to
hold decision- makers accountable to society for the consequences of their actions and to
reconcile diverse perspectives.  There must be institutions beyond — not in place of —
governments and markets.
We see a primary role for (natural and social) scientific inquiry, open popular discussion of
principles of justice, and pluralistic legal and political mechanisms to limit the power of anyindividual or group.  Science can identify the true nature of the sustainability challenge by
improving our understanding of the complex web of natural-social interdependence and by
identifying prospective paths through which distinct goals can be mutually supported.  Science
can check demagoguery and foolishness.  So can widespread popular discussion of principles of
(distributive and procedural) justice, thereby building a case for choosing mutually acceptable
strategies over others which might yield more gains for one constituency but less for one or more
of the others.  Pluralism ensures that all perspectives can be voiced.  We do not mean to idealize
pluralistic institutions, science, or moral philosophy, but rather to emphasize the inherent
complementarity of the three and the necessity of looking to extragovernmental and extramarket
institutions for support in achieving sustainable societies.
15  The light of scientific scrutiny and
participatory processes tends to induce greater adherence to ethical standards.  A commitment to
truth and open public scrutiny improves scientific discovery.  A widespread commitment to
procedural and distributive justice and substantive, scientific input helps keep participatory
processes from devolving into chaos.  Science can be complemented by ethics and modern ethical
studies can likewise benefit from closer contact with the social and natural sciences. Participative
political processes are important to this integration.  Hence, our advocacy of a holistic approach
emphasizing the search for common ground based on a shared understanding of the
interrelationship between different species and subpopulations of species.
16
Science can help uncover common ground (e.g. Norton’s consensus argument), but
scientific discovery alone will not suffice, since the fundamental problem is the existence of
externalities which cannot be reconciled through any mechanism—whether government- or
market-based—if humans do not consider the full range of legitimate interests beyond their own. 
The articulation and promotion of suitable, pluralistic institutional procedures, and environmentalethics are equally important to the productive resolution of environmental controversy.  Most
fundamentally, clear standards of justice are necessary because of the wildly unequal distribution
of decision-making power; a small subpopulation of a single species (Homo sapiens) wields
unusual power to exercise unchecked discretion within the ecosystem.  However, in the presence
of an ethic to which individuals subscribe, people do become accountable: to their conscience,
their God, or whatever the source of their ethics.  Empirical evidence indicates that people then
freely undertake profit-sacrificing environmental stewardship that reduces environmental
externalities.
17  A central objective of environmental protection movements must be to define and
promote a holistic ecological ethic so as to enlarge the population which values environmental
protection and the satisfaction of basic human needs sufficiently to generate an environmentally
and socially sustainable society.  Participatory decision-making processes are a requisite,
institutional step in that direction.
Our three-compartment model suggests that for policies to be sustainable in the long-term,
they must formally and simultaneously consider the legitimate goals of protecting the
environment, meeting basic human needs, and advancing economic welfare.  Where policies are
designed and implemented at the intersection of multiple goals, they at least avoid imposing
negative externalities on the intersecting goals and likely advance all three simultaneously. 
Policies that intersect all three policy objectives are not only holistic and pluralistic, but they are
also far more likely to prove sustainable.
18  The further a policy set is from the area of intersection
in our imaginary Venn diagram, the more serious the negative externalities involved and the
higher the probability of nearer-term system collapse.
Before concluding the section, let us address an anticipated objection.  Some would
challenge our belief that one can reconcile pursuit of economic welfare, the satisfaction of basichuman needs, and environmental protection.  This question ldeserves a paper much longer than
this one, so we do not attempt a complete treatment here.  Instead, we make just one fundamental
point in our defense: there is enough evidence of mutual reinforcement among these goals, under
some all policy designs, to cast reasonable doubt on the counterclaim that the area of intersection
among the three is an empty set.  We certainly have much to learn about which approaches lie at
the heart of the Venn diagram, but there is considerable empirical evidence to support the claim
that the maintenance (even improvement) of ecosystem health can be consistent with economic
growth.
19  Similarly, there is both empirical and theoretical evidence that the satisfaction of basic
human needs contributes directly to the protection of environmental resources (e.g., forests, soils,
water, wildlife) and that economic growth can improve the lot of the poor and satisfaction of
basic human needs.  On balance, the empirical and theoretical evidence suggests our three stylized
spheres of interest indeed intersect, but by no means fully. 
II.  Value Systems and Sustainability
The simple Venn diagram model described in the preceding section provides a way of
visualizing and reconciling the multiple mundane objectives involved in contemporary debates
about sustainable development.  Given complex feedback mechanisms within human societies and
between human society and the natural environment, the most holistic and pluralistic approaches
appear most sustainable in practice.  There is an important parallel in environmental ethics.  A
holistic and pluralistic approach to value systems may likewise help foster sustainable human
societies, especially since widespread acceptance of and respect for ethical standards is central to
resolving the difficult externalities problems involved in seeking sustainable paths of human
development, as argued in the previous section.This section briefly summarizes the four dominant value systems found in contemporary
environmental discourse.  An objective in this section is to show that there is probably more
common ground between opposing camps than is commonly recognized.  We will then argue in
section three for a holistic, pluralistic approach to value systems in sustainability debates.
Environmental ethical perspectives may be classified in a variety of ways.  One common
dichotomous division is between monistic and pluralistic approaches.  In the limit, monists search
for central principles that form the basis for a unified ethic from which all moral judgements can
be derived.  Pluralists, meanwhile, explicitly recognize as valid a variety of approaches and ethical
frameworks which can be used to address moral issues.  Therefore, pluralists commonly arrive at
moral judgements in less structured ways.
20  In a recent critique of the monistic approach, which
often seems to dominate mainstream environmentalism, Norton concludes: "...if a monistic theory
is to account for all environmental obligations, it must account for the differences, as well as the
similarities, in treatment that should be accorded differing elements of nature.  To deny this will be
to homogenize environmental policy, ignore irreconcilable conflicts of interest in nature, and insist
that one ontologically grounded moral theory applies throughout the universe."
21  We concur that
a pluralistic approach embracing a wide range of underlying perspectives — including monist ones
— is essential for addressing sustainability controversies in the real world.  Indeed, we argue in
the next section that given imperfect information about the universe and the future and in
recognition of human error and finitude, only pluralistic approaches are feasible.  Moreover, and
paradoxically, pluralism might better accommodate the ultimate aims of many monists better than
non-pluralistic processes because of the problems of imperfect human agency.
The monism-pluralism axis is but one dimension of the environmental ethics literature. 
Another distinguishes among three distinct ethical perspectives: biocentrism, ecocentrism, andanthropocentrism.
22   One well-represented view within mainstream environmentalism currently is
biocentrism.  Perhaps the most influential statements of biocentric thought can be found in the
writings of Paul Taylor.
23  His  "biocentric outlook" consists of four major beliefs which can be
summarized as: (i) humans are members of the Earth's community; (ii) all species are integral
elements in a system of interdependence; (iii) all organisms are centers of life, each pursuing its
own good; and (iv) humans are not inherently superior to other living things.  We maintain that
only the fourth belief is problematic to most opponents of biocentrism.  Moreover, when
considering the "priority principles" Taylor proposes for resolving conflicting claims among
species, belief four may not even be necessary.  In like manner, others have argued that some
components of "biocentric" beliefs can be held by those who do not consider themselves
biocentrists.  For example, Hargrove notes that even though the notion of "intrinsic value" for
living things (as opposed to conceiving of them only in instrumental terms) has been identified
primarily with biocentrism, it can also be a part of other perspectives.
24  Biocentrism is not fully
disjoint from anthropocentrist or ecocentrist perspectives; there is an important area of
intersection.
The second major perspective is ecocentrism, essentially an expansion of "life-centered"
biocentrism to include abiotic components of the environment.  Ecocentrism offers a perspective
that emphasizes systemic values, caring less about individual life forms than about their
interactions.  Ecocentrism has partly evolved out of biocentrism, but it also can be traced to Aldo
Leopold's "land ethic."
25  Ecocentrists share biocentrists’ belief in the intrinsic worth of non-
human elements of the biosphere.  By emphasizing interactions, however, ecocentrists also share
anthropocentrists’ instrumental valuation of the natural environment.  Ecocentrism thus sharesimportant common ground with both biocentrism and anthropocentrism, even if proponents’ of
each sometimes clash.
The final perspective is “anthropocentrism”, or "human-centered” valuation. 
Anthropocentrist thought has dominated moral philosophy for nearly all of its history. 
Anthropocentrism comes in at least two varieties that differ markedly: "strong" and "weak".
26 
"Strong" (or "heavy") anthropocentrists emphasize human dominion over nature and treat the
nonhuman environment primarily as a bundle of natural resources to be managed and exploited for
maximal human gain.  This is the view that is captured in much of natural resource economics.  In
the strong anthropocentric tradition, the moral value of things is reducible without remainder to
the value it creates for human beings, whether through the generation of monetary income
through resource exploitation, or of pleasure through amenities use or simply knowledge of the
existence of ecosystems in their natural state.  In this view, environmental protection is purely a
means to the ends of human utility maximization, and thus is not always worth pursuing.  The
ecosystem has only instrumental value, not intrinsic worth.  While many environmentalists may
abhor this view, it can be reconciled in practice (albeit not in theory) with biocentric, ecocentric
and weak anthropocentric approaches, in analogous fashion to our opening example of duck
hunters’ instrumental valuation of wetlands preservation.
"Weak" (or "broad" or "longsighted") anthropocentrism, by contrast, focuses not on
immediate human gratification so much as on the satisfaction of basic needs for the whole human
community, present and future, and maintenance of the ecosystem of which we are a part.  The
metric of analysis is consequently more complex.  As in the “basic human needs” literature in
international development,
27 the emphasis here falls on ensuring all humans enjoy adequate
standards of nutrition, health, shelter, water and sanitation, and education.  Somewhat moregenerally, Sen’s capabilities and freedoms approach captures the essence of this concern to try to
provide all persons, across space and time, with the capabilities to choose to (not) satisfy basic
human needs.
28  Weak anthropocentrists, like ecocentrists, tend to pay attention to the complex
interactions between and dynamics of human societies and natural environments.  Given
uncertainty about dynamics and interactions, the weak anthropocentric approach often favors
caution with respect to resource exploitation (“safe minimum standards”), sometimes best
expressed in the emerging field of ecological economics.   Moreover, like ecocentrists and
biocentrists, weak anthropocentrists often ascribe intrinsic value to nature.  But, where nonhuman
species threaten the satisfaction of basic human needs (e.g., elephants that trample crops, malarial
mosquitoes), weak anthropocentrists may oppose environmental protection.  African
conservationists’ opposition to the CITES ivory ban and widespread refusal by developing
country governments to ban chemical insecticides partly reflect such thought.  Weak
anthropocentrists like Norton therefore oppose the homogenization of environmental policy
implied by monist thought.  
The weak anthropocentrist worldview is distinct from the strong version in that social
activists assert the moral imperative of care for marginalized communities — which might include
unrepresented future generations.  It also generally rejects the cost-benefit analysis — especially
the sort that discounts future costs and benefits — that guides strong anthropocentrist decision-
making, and they acknowledge nature’s intrinsic value.  The weak anthropocentrist position is
perhaps best understood as a systemic one with a weak preferential option for humanity.  We are
sympathetic to this worldview.
Too often commentators emphasize the differences between these distinct ethical
traditions, not their similarities.  For instance, undergraduate environmental science textbookstypically include a chapter on ethics that juxtaposes extreme positions.  Terms like "frontier" vs.
"environmental” ethics or "throwaway" vs. "sustainable earth" worldviews are sometimes used to
label the extremes.
29  This stylized representation symbolizes and perhaps feeds what we consider
a disturbing tendency toward polarization in academic and policy debates on environmental
policy.  This makes genuinely inclusive and pluralistic processes more difficult to maintain, even
as it becomes more obvious that authentically participative approaches are central to achieving
sustainable societies. 
III. Pluralistic Stewardship
In an important sense, the language of value systems, or “centrisms”, is itself a source of
the controversy, in which anthropocentrists, biocentrists and ecocentrists are too often
unnecessarily pitted against one another.  There are indisputably important differences between
these perspectives in what things are deemed morally considerable.  But respecting the differences
between different parties is not an argument against seeking consensus, or what Norton calls
“contextualism.”  Indeed, in this and the next section we argue that the optimal approach to
environmental policymaking is one that respects the different foci of alternative centrisms without
yielding to the subordination of all to any one, i.e., a pluralistic approach.
Niebuhr suggests a useful distinction between centrisms that (1) indicate ultimate values
that are to take priority in cases of conflict, i.e., a “priority focus,” and those that (2) reflect the
scope of the values to be represented in inquiry and normative assessment, i.e., a “scope focus.”
30 
This is a subtle but crucial and commonly overlooked distinction, on which we build our case for
pluralistic stewardship.  Our empirical claim is that virtually all people are in practice pluralists,
appealing to a variety of low level general principles to justify or criticize choices.  Individualsrecognize and employ an assortment of scope-focused centrisms but do not consistently subscribe
to any one priority-focused centrism.  Rather, they tend to choose paths that permit them to
reconcile distinct values they hold simultaneously.  If this view is accurate, why demand of a
population what few, if any, of its members practice in their individual choice patterns?   Instead
of emphasizing the competition between centrisms and attempting to find a set of ordered
principles that allows univocal resolution of value conflicts, why not seek first to identify and
pursue perhaps abundant common ground?  This question is the core motivation for the pluralistic
stewardship we espouse.
A core common belief of (almost) all who are concerned about the environment is that
humanity must “steward” the natural world.  The question of for whom we steward these gives
rise to sharp differences of opinion, but the general notion of stewardship is common to all the
world views we have described.
31  Where participants focus on this common ground, mutually
desirable progress can be made.  We submit that all parties’ objectives will be better served if
more attention is paid to the “how” questions of stewardship in practice and process, and less to
the “for whom” questions.  Put differently, we believe the centrisms discussed in the previous
section should be considered Niebuhr’s scope-focused centrisms that declare what their adherents
believe counts morally, not priority-focused centrisms that ultimately rank alternative courses of
action.  
Within the biosphere only humankind is capable of exercising and acting on moral
judgements.  Environmental valuation and policy making is thus immutably anthropogenic,
although not necessarily anthropocentric.  The whole of creation cannot represent itself in the
ongoing human debate about our relationship with nature.  Instead, people champion the cause of
other species and of the biosphere’s abiotic components, and reasonable people disagree about thenature of the interactions and dynamics of the biosphere’s constituent systems.  Humans’
extraordinary cognitive skills and moral nature endow us with an ability and a responsibility to
exercise choice on behalf of a broader universe of biotic and abiotic elements.  In this important,
practical sense, all debate about sustainability is anthropogenic, for environmental controversy
reflects the scope of values articulated by human agents acting on behalf of both themselves and
nonhuman principals.  The challenge of sustainability arises primarily because of limited human
appreciation of (i) the roles of nonhuman species and abiotic elements in complex ecosystems and
(ii) our own delicate place in these systems, which do not exist for our satisfaction so much as for
our stewardship and because of limited mechanisms for ensuring a morally defensible human
relation to nature.  Hence “conservation”, a word with insightful etymology: “con-”, meaning
“together” and “servare”, meaning “to keep”.  Together we keep the biosphere; we are its
stewards.  And in togetherness, common ground takes precedence.  We may disagree amongst
ourselves as to what entities have greater moral value, but we must not let these disagreements
obstruct our pursuit of paths that satisfy a variety of perspectives.
At this point, let us briefly digress to make plain our own perspective on environmental
ethics.  We subscribe to the weak anthropocentric view that although humans are not exclusively
valuable, as implied by strong anthropocentrism, neither are they of equal value with all other
species, as suggested by biocentrists.  For a variety of reasons, including humans’ unique capacity
and responsibility to steward the rest of creation, the value of humankind is superior to that of
otherkind.  Moreover, because all components have value, so too do they possess rights, but
“biotic rights are not the same full set of rights that humans enjoy or equal rights with humans.”
32  
Values and rights derive from what Nash labels “ecological relationality”, a contextual approach
that considers both the intrinsic and the instrumental values of all creatures, the latter basedespecially on the corporate interests of the ecosystem.
33  The complex ecology by which biotic
and abiotic elements are related physically necessarily relates them morally.  Furthermore, the
integrated whole of the biosphere has a reality independent of and greater than the sum of its
parts. Yet while we as individuals are attracted primarily to the weak anthropocentric perspective,
we see a need for other perspectives to accompany ours at decision making tables.
If one recognizes and appreciates the complex interactions of various biotic and abiotic
elements in the functioning of the ecosystem, we submit that one ought likewise to recognize and
appreciate complex interactions among scope-focused centrisms in the anthropogenic project of
stewarding the biosphere.  Just as biodiversity is necessary to preserve the richness of the physical
environment, we put forward the corollary that diversity of value systems might be equally
essential to preserve the richness of the moral and spiritual environment which motivates humanity
to take proper care of the biosphere.
34  The reality of the whole is comprised of multiple parts and
perhaps multiple explanations and dynamics, none of which alone allows humankind to approach
complete understanding.  We therefore advocate a practice of pluralistic stewardship because no
mortal being knows fully how to protect the whole biosphere.  Successful stewardship therefore
requires the interaction of multiple value systems that collectively ensure reasonably holistic
choice by constraining the range of decision-makers’ choice.  An environmental monist implicitly
places great faith in the capacity of a human decision maker to understand and follow the ultimate
principle.  The irony is that these same environmentalists routinely point to human ignorance
leading to anthropogenic environmental degradation, even while holding great expectations of
humanity’s ability to understand and act upon an ultimate principle applied to unimaginably
complex systems.  We are less sanguine, believing the biosphere too complex to be well
understood by humans any time soon, and humans too fallible to be trusted unconditionally. Hence the practical need for pluralistic stewardship, to erect a system of checks and balances. 
The process of social decision making, whether by businesses, conservation groups, development
organizations, or governments, demands consideration of the positions articulated by advocates of
the range of scope-focused centrisms.  We offer the principle of “pluralistic stewardship” as a
holistic means of environmental policy analysis and decision making that admits diversity of
perspectives on sustainability matters and focuses on their complementary interaction and the
need to protect the whole system, not just its privileged, or particular underprivileged,
components.  
IV.  Choosing the Right Path
Humanity enjoys disproportionate power to impose its will on the environment and
thereby to influence the future path of the whole biosphere, humanity included.  Indeed, this
highlights a subtle irony: it is humanity’s awesome power over creation that motivates even the
most ardently biocentric of environmentalists.  Yet this points to the immutable anthropogenic
process to which we have already referred.  Humanity is both within nature, in biophysical terms,
and above it, in decision-making capacity and authority.  Yet because individual humans exhibit
idiosyncratic preferences, suffer limited cognitive capacity, and are fallible and finite-lived, it is
unlikely that any individual or subgroup could or would pursue an appropriately balanced path. 
Whatever the principal one imagines lies behind contemporary sustainability challenges, there is an
associated human agency problem.  When one admits the multifaceted human agency problem in
representing nonhuman interests, it becomes plain that a pluralistic process offers the highest
probability of delivering environmental protection consistent with a stewardship ethic.  Our
approach thus advocates pluralistic political processes for the admission and celebration of diverseperspectives.  Pluralism of that sort is the means by which we have the best chance of overcoming
divisiveness and achieving unity, the identification and pursuit of goals common to all the
participating perspectives. 
Continued poor understanding of the complex web of interrelationships that link all
elements (including humans) of a community may lead to disbelief in the existence of a common
ground and to intolerance of others’ world views.  This clearly poses a challenge to any holistic
approach.  Our concern is that initiatives that fail to integrate the diverse, legitimate interests of
distinct stakeholders are a siren’s call of sorts, attracting attention and resources but ultimately
making it difficult to shift from what may prove to be an unsustainable path to another that might
be sustainable.  This section makes the case for careful and critical ex ante assessment of policy
paths. 
It might seem an attractive intermediate step to pursue policies compatible with any two of
the three objectives depicted as intersecting spheres in our heuristic model of section one, and, to
a certain extent, that may be true.  Only through designing and experimenting with strategies that
seem to show promise do we discover whether a policy approach lies at the intersection of all
three spheres, any pair, or is not at an intersection at all.  We therefore support pursuit of
intermediate strategies on an experimental basis and on a modest scale.  We are, however,
concerned that in peoples’ enthusiasm to find a durable solution we do not collectively dive head
first into a mirage from which it can be difficult to extricate ourselves.
The principle risk involved in following a strategy compatible with less than all three
objectives is the “path dependence” of policy and technology.  The notion of path dependence
emerges from nonstationary game theoretic models in which an agent’s optimal present choice
depends on the history of the game, i.e., the path followed.  The economic concept of pathdependence derives from two sources: (1) the existence of positive feedback effects associated
with fixed costs,
35 economies of scale,
36 learning effects,
37 or any combination of these; and (2) the
existence of alternative choices at some juncture.  Path dependence emphasizes that at any point
in time there exist multiple feasible approaches to achieving a particular set of objectives, but
these approaches compete for resources.  Moreover, the triumph of one path over others becomes
self-sustaining in that its relative efficiency increases endogenously as its acceptance spreads. 
Turning back thus becomes more costly and less likely, and development strategies thereby
become canalized.
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We anticipate path dependence in the articulation and dissemination of environmental
ethics and in policy formulation.  Most people find it difficult to value several competing ethics
simultaneously; there is a large degree of exclusivity to one’s ethical beliefs.  And once one has
grown comfortable with a particular ethical system, it is often quite difficult to shift to another
system.  Policies likewise create their own constituencies, not least of which among the officials
tasked with implementing a policy and the policy’s beneficiaries.  We are thus concerned that
unsustainable strategies, and the ethical codes that give rise to them, can become difficult to
reverse once strongly supported.  Hence the need for care in choosing the right path.
Consider, for example, the economic development strategies in vogue during the early
post-World War II years.  These emphasized industrialization, the transfer of economic surplus
from agriculture to industry, and state central planning of economic growth.  Countries attaining
independence during this period—disproportionately from Africa and South and Southeast
Asia—tended to follow a statist approach to development which helped bring both environmental
and social crises.  Reversing the spiral of agricultural and environmental degradation, rapid
population growth and sociopolitical instability is proving difficult in these nations. The boundaries of the areas of intersection among the three compartments in our model
are clearly unknown; the search for a sustainable path is necessarily stochastic.   Integrated
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) currently in vogue in the developing world are
one approach that comes close to achieving the desired holism and pluralism we advocate. While
we have been critical of the present design of some ICDPs,
39 they properly couple conservation
efforts with measures to relieve endemic poverty and social problems in human communities and
policies to foster economic growth in the host region.  ICDPs “aim to achieve conservation goals
by promoting development and providing local people with alternative income sources that sustain
rather than threaten the flora and fauna in natural habitats”.
40  ICDPs have emerged to replace the
old “fences and fines” approach to protected area conservation, which often punished the poor for
animal poaching or slash-and-burn cultivation needed for peoples’ survival.  ICDPs involve
quasicontractual arrangements wherein residents of communities on the periphery of a protected
area surrender access to, or curtail illegal offtake of, native species and their habitats in exchange
for alternative sources of income and sustenance.  At their best, ICDPs are highly participatory,
community-based exercises in establishing and maintaining a shared commitment between
conservation professionals, development specialists, and impoverished communities to respect and
promote each others’ objectives.  Such initiatives are relatively new and have generally been
enthusiastically embraced by environmental managers, although there are indications of problems
in several respects that raise doubts about particular designs’ long-term effectiveness as
sustainable strategies.
41  Still there are multiple, context-driven designs for ICDPs that, in
aggregate, constitute a major, promising range of experiments toward identifying sustainable
strategies. ICDPs offer important examples of policy efforts that explicitly adopt an ecological ethic
holistic enough to be respectful of the distinct world views of different community members and
the needs to search for and seize common ground.  At the very least, these initiatives might be
viewed as the first pragmatic steps in this direction.  At best, the most successful ones may
provide transferable lessons in how to cultivate and implement a holistic ethic of sustainability
among human communities of divergent interests. 
We predict that the greatest success will likely emerge from multiple, simultaneous,
experimental approaches that keep bets on any single strategy modest until its ramifications are
reasonably well understood.  Having established the design, implementation, and results of an
approach, policy makers can then reinforce success.  In this way path-dependence can be used
toward positive ends, with success becoming self-sustaining.  There is anecdotal evidence of this
occurring in U.S. watershed management as state departments of natural resources try multiple-
management regimes, then move most (if not all) sites over to the approach that brings the best
results, thereby spatially extending and institutionally deepening the most sustainable strategy. 
Similarly, African wildlife and forest managers have been experimenting with a variety of ICDP
designs and have been reasonably active in sharing lessons learned among themselves so as to
promote more sustainable conservation and rural development efforts.
V.  Conclusions
Contemporary debate about environmentally sustainable societies is too often a
confrontational struggle between strong anthropocentric (“save it so we can use it”) and extreme
biocentric (“all species are of equal worth and must be preserved”) perspectives.  Ecologically and
morally, however, humans as a species have a much broader range of relationships to otherspecies than purely adversarial.  We, like others before us, argue that fuller consideration of the
complex relationships within humankind and between humans and other species leads to a more
holistic ecological ethic than one typically witnesses in the environmentalism of the contemporary
industrial world.  A holistic ecological ethic respects a diversity of world views, recognizes the
potential for mutually compatible strategies, and seeks them out.  This is pluralistic stewardship,
in which priority is given, in both process and practice, to reconciliation of multiple scope-focused
centrisms in the belief that there is ample as yet unexploited common ground among reasonable
people of differeing perspectives.
The whole of creation is in need of protection if its human and nonhuman systems are to
prove sustainable for generations to come.  There is increasing recognition of the complex
interconnectedness and dynamics of all components of the planet.  But the human agents for
different value systems, and thus for different elements of the biosphere, routinely fail to
communicate and coordinate effectively.  The whole of creation is thus like a body without the
nervous system that ensures a proper working relationship among the body’s organs.  A nervous
system is necessary for the optimal functioning of the body as a unit.  Not only does lack of
communication lead to coordination failures in contemporary sustainability efforts, it too often
begets disrespect which sows the seeds of future communication and coordination problems.  A
dialogical approach is necessary, in which science, pluralistic political processes, and the
promulgation of widespread appreciation of the ecological and moral demands of sustainable
societies play a central part.1.  Bryan G. Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991); Bryan G. Norton, “A New Paradigm for Environmental Management” In Robert Costanza,
BryanG. Norton, and Benjamin D. Haskell (eds.), Ecosystem Health: New Goals for
Environmental Management (Washington: Island Press, 1992).  See B. K. Steverson,
"Contextualism and Norton's Convergence Hypothesis," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 135-
150 for a recent critical assessment of Norton's ideas.
2.  Raymond E. Grizzle, “Environmentalism Should Include Human Ecological Needs.”
BioScience 44 (1994): 263-8; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), Note to
Correspondents (April 12), (Office of Communication, Education, and Public Affairs, 1994).  The
model is also a formal representation of what others have suggested (e.g. Ismail Serageldin and
Andrew Steer, eds., Making Development Sustainable: From Concepts to Action (Washington
D.C.: The World Bank, 1994); Indicators of Sustainable Development, The Wuppertal Workshop
- 15-17 November 1995 (UN Commission on Sustainable Development, 1995).
3. Sharachchandra M.Lélé, “Sustainable Development: A Critical Review,” World Development
19 (1991):609.
4.  We use the term "human needs" as essentially synonymous with "human rights" as the latter
appears in the current environmental ethics literature (e.g., James  W. Nickel and Eduardo Viola,
"Integrating Environmentalism and Human Rights," Environmental Ethics 16 (1994): 265-273). 
Our definition of human needs follows Paul Streeten, Shahid J. Burki, Mahbub Ul Haq, Norman
Hicks, and Frances Stewart,  First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) and includes the assurance of adequate
standards of nutrition, health, shelter, water and sanitation, and education.
5.Herman Daly is one of the most articulate voices for this position.  See, for instance, his recent 
Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996)
6. Robert Solow is perhaps the best known proponent of this view.  See his “An Almost Practical
Step Toward Sustainability,” invited lecture at Resources for the Future, 1992.
7. See, for instance, Lélé, “Sustainable Development: A Critical Review,”; Ralph C.d’Arge,
Richard B.Norgaard, Mancur Olson Jr., and Richard Somerville, “Economic Growth,
Sustainability, and the Environment,” Contemporary Policy Issues 9 (1991): 1-23; Partha
Dasgupta, An Inquiry Into Well-Being and Destitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
or Christopher B.Barrett, “Fairness, Stewardship and Sustainable Development,” Ecological
Economics 19(1996):11-17.
8. In his Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, Norton uses such a two-compartment model. 
His view seems to be that our "human needs" and "economic welfare" concerns can be combined
into a "socioeconomic" sphere.
Notes9. Streeten et al., First Things First; Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987); United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report
1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., The
Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
10. The traditional yardstick of macroeconomic performance, growth in gross domestic product
(GDP) or gross national product (GNP), both omits net changes in natural resource stocks (a
point about which many environmentalists have agitated), and imposes a weighted utilitarian
social welfare function, in which individuals’ weights are equal to their income the previous
period.  Humans’ social value is directly attributable to income in the usual measure.
11.  Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973);
National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), Economic Justice For All: Pastoral Letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (Washington, D.C.: NCCB, 1986).
12.  On the Kenyan case, see Michael Norton-Griffiths and Clive Southey, “The Opportunity
Costs of Biodiversity Conservation in Kenya,” Ecological Economics 12 (1995):125-39, and J.S.
Akama, C.L. Lant, and G.W. Burnett, “Conflicting Attitudes Toward State Wildlife Conservation
Programs in Kenya,” Society and Natural Resources 8 (1995):133-44.  More generally, see
Michael Wells, Katrina Brandon and Lee Hannah, People and Parks: Linking Protected Area
Management with Local Communities (Washington: World Bank, 1992), Christopher B.Barrett
and Peter Arcese, “Are ICDPs Sustainable? On The Conservation of Large Mammals in Sub-
Saharan Africa" World Development 23 (1995):1073-1085.
13.  Geir B. Asheim, "Sustainability: Ethical Foundations and Economic Properties."  World Bank
Policy Research working paper 1302; Joachim von Amsberg, “Excessive Environmental Risks:
An Intergenerational Market Failure,” European Economic Review 39 (1995):1447-64.
14. See Richard B. Howarth and Richard B.Norgaard, “Intergenerational Resource Rights,
Efficiency, and Social Optimality,” Land Economics (1990): 1-11.
15.  For example, what we know and how we interpret knowledge depends on both our individual
ethics and our collective rules of interaction, which together determine the power relations in
society.  Pluralistic rules and individual ethical commitments to pluralism provide a check on
science.
16.  Platteau analogously emphasizes the importance of “generalized morality” to the
establishment of efficient markets, where all market failures cannot be fully resolved by
government authority or by the careful definition of property rights (Jean-Philippe Platteau,
“Behind The Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist—Parts I and II,” Journal of Development
Studies 30 (1994): 533-77 and 753-817. 
17. David Colman, “Ethics and Externalities: Agricultural Stewardship and Other Behaviour: 
Presidential Address.”  Journal of Agricultural Economics  45 (1994): 299-311;  Timothy
O'Riordan, "Frameworks for Choice:  Core Beliefs and the Environment." Environment
37(October 1995): 4-9; 25-29.18. This consistency can be of either strong or weak varieties.  Strong consistency advances all
goals simultaneously.  Weak consistency does no harm to any goal and will thus include strong
consistency as a proper subset.  To maximize the set of sustainable strategies, we invoke weak
consistency based on a “do no harm” standard. 
19.  See d’Arge et al., “Economic Growth, Sustainability, and the Environment,” John M. Antle
and Gregg Heidebrink, “Environment and Development: Theory and International Evidence,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 43 (1995): 603-25; or Gene M. Grossman and
Alan B. Krueger, “Economic Growth and the Environment.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics
(1995): 353-77.
20.  See, for example, Eugene C. Hargrove's Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989, p. 8) assessment of our search for an environmental ethic: "...our
environmental ethic, when we really have one, will be a collection of independent ethical
generalizations, only loosely related, not a rationally ordered system of ethical prescriptions."
21. Bryan G. Norton, "Why I am not a nonanthropocentrist," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995):
357.  Also see Hargrove’s Foundations of Environmental Ethics for similar arguments, and a
"weakly anthropocentric" perspective.
22.  Each of these perspectives forms the basis for particular ethical movements like "Deep
Ecology," "Eco-Feminism," etc.  Instead of treating all the various movements, we only consider
the fundamental underlying perspectives.
23.  Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986).  James P. Sterba, "From Biocentric Individualism to Biocentric
Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 191-207, provides a concise review of the influence
of Taylor's arguments, and offers some revisions of his "priority principles."
24.  Hargrove,  Foundations of Environmental Ethics; James A. Nash, Loving Nature: Ecological
Integrity and Christian Responsibility (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991), p. 10.
25. J. Baird Callicott, "I. Overview" in Encyclopedia of Bioethics, revised edition (New York:
Simon & Schuster Macmaillan): 680-83 reviews the ecocentrism literature.
26. Hargrove's Foundations of Environmental Ethics,  Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics
and Weak Anthropocentrism." Environmental Ethics 6 (1984):131-48, or Frederick Ferré,
"Persons in Nature: Toward an Applicable and Unified Environmental Ethics," Zygon 28 (1993):
441-53
27.  For example, see Streeten et al.,  First Things First.
28. See Amartya Sen’s Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985), “Well
Being and Capability”, in Nussbaum and Sen, The Quality of Life, or Inequality Reexamined.
29.  See, for example, Daniel D. Chiras, Environmental Science: Action for a Sustainable Future
(Redwood City, CA: Benjamin Cummings, 1994), pp. 494ff; and G.Tyler Miller, Jr., Living in theEnvironment (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994), pp.  683ff.  See Max Oelschlaeger,
Caring for Creation: An Ecumenical Approach to the Environmental Crisis (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1994), p. 3, for a similar criticism of such simplistic “binary opposition”
perspectives.
30. H.Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (London: Faber and Faber,
1960).
31. Oelschlaeger, Caring for Creation; Christopher B. Barrett, "Fairness, Stewardship and
Sustainable Development." Ecological Economics, 19 (October 1996):11-17.
32.James A.Nash, “Biotic Rights and Human Ecological Responsibilities,” Society of Christian
Ethics Annual (Boston: Society of Christian Ethics, 1993), p. 152.
33. Nash, “Biotic Rights”.
34. See Raymond E. Grizzle and Christopher B. Barrett, "The One Body of Christian
Environmentalism," Zygon, forthcoming.
35.  In particular, with irrecoverable fixed costs, often called sunk costs. 
36.  Economies of scale are present when a uniform expansion of input quantities generates a
disproportionately great increase in output.  This implies average costs fall with output. 
37.  Learning effects occur when efficiency improves with experience, yielding externalities
economists label “learning by doing” (Kenneth A. Arrow,  “The Economic Implications of
Learning by Doing,” Review of Economic Studies (1962): 155-73). 
38.  Path dependence is particularly associated with the development of technologies, such as the
QWERTY typewriter keyboard (Paul David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.”  American
Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-7), light-water nuclear reactors, or the gasoline engine (W.
Brian Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-In By Historical Events,”
Economic Journal 99 (1989): 116-31).  It has also been used to explain environmental decline
(Eban Goodstein, “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path
Dependence?”  Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1995): 1029-43).
39. Barrett and Arcese, “Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs)
Sustainable?”; Christopher B. Barrett and Peter Arcese, “Wildlife Harvest in Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs): Linking Harvest to Household Demand,
Agricultural Production and Environmental Shocks in the Serengeti,” Land Economics,
forthcoming. 
40.  Mohan Munasinghe, “Economic and Policy Issues in Natural Habitats and Protected Areas.” 
In Mohan Munasinghe and Jeffrey A. McNeely (eds.), Protected Area Economics and Policy:
Linking Conservation and Sustainable Development (Washington: IUCN and World Bank,
1994).41. Wells, Brandon, and Hannah , People and Parks; Patrick C. West and Steven R. Brechin
(eds.), Resident Peoples and National Parks:  Social Dilemmas and Strategies in International
Conservation (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991); David Western, R.Michael Wright,
and Shirley C. Strum, Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation
(Washington: Island Press, 1994); Barrett and Arcese, “Are Integrated
Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) Sustainable?;” and Barrett and Arcese, “Wildlife
Harvest in Integrated Conservation and Development Projects.”.